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Abstract 
 
 
This study shows that the rate of wage inflation in the year before a recession is 
positively related to the rate of employment growth in the subsequent recovery. A 
possible explanation for this relationship is downward nominal wage rigidity. On the 
other hand, the prior rate of wage inflation is not significantly related to the employment 
decline during the ensuing recession, suggesting that prior wage growth has a greater 
impact on the strength of the recovery from a recession than on the severity of the 
recession. 
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Pre-Recession Wage Inflation and the Strength of the Subsequent Recovery 
 
1. Introduction 
The rate at which employment rebounds from recessions varies greatly. In the U.S., 
the recoveries from the last three NBER-dated recessions have been characterized by 
unusually slow growth of employment, relative to previous post-World War II recessions. 
This study suggests that one determinant of the strength of employment growth during a 
recovery is the rate of wage inflation in the year before the employment decline. A possible 
reason for this relationship is downward nominal wage rigidity. A lower rate of wage 
inflation before a recession means that the adjustment to a negative demand shock is more 
likely to entail wage reductions for some workers. If these reductions do not occur because of 
downward nominal wage rigidity, then, ceteris paribus, employment growth will be slower.   
Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) demonstrate that higher rates of inflation may 
allow more real wage reductions to occur in equilibrium, yielding a lower natural rate. The 
present study shows a second avenue through which inflation may “grease the wheels of the 
labor market,” by enabling employment to rebound more quickly from recessions (with the 
caveat that the sample size is small). Thus, it suggests a partial explanation for the slow 
employment growth during the recoveries from the past three recessions, recessions in which 
the prior rate of wage inflation was far lower than in most of the previous eight post-war 
recessions. 
2. Empirical Relationship between Wage Inflation and Recovery Strength 
Table 1 reports figures on employment and wage inflation in the 11 post-WWII 
recessions and subsequent recoveries in the U.S. The months of the business cycle peaks and 
troughs are the months when employment reaches its highest level and lowest level, 
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respectively, and these dates may differ from the NBER’s dating. The first four columns are 
the month and employment level for peak and trough employment.1 The percentage decline 
in peak-to-trough employment is reported in the fifth column. The sixth and seventh columns 
give the month and employment level when employment recovers to at least its previous 
peak. The months between trough employment and recovery employment is recorded in the 
eighth column, and the ninth column reports a measure of the strength of the recovery, 
defined as the annualized percentage change in employment from its trough value to its 
recovery value.2  
The last two columns report measures of wage inflation in the year before the start of 
the employment downturn. In the tenth column wage inflation is measured by average hourly 
earnings (AHE) for production and nonsupervisory workers.3 These data have been collected 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) since 1964, so data are not available to measure pre-
recession wage inflation for the first four postwar recessions. However, data on average 
hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers in goods-producing industries 
(AHEGP) have been collected since 1947, encompassing all postwar recessions, and these 
figures are reported in the 11th column. (Goods-producing industries include natural 
resources and mining; mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction; construction; and 
manufacturing.) Even though goods-producing industries are only a portion of all industries, 
wage inflation in goods-producing industries is highly correlated with overall wage inflation, 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.970 over the period in which data are available for both 
series.4   
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the percentage change in average hourly 
earnings (AHE) in the year before a recession and the measured value of the recovery 
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strength (RS) for post-1964 recessions. Points are denoted with the month of the pre-
recession peak employment. Also plotted is the estimated OLS regression line, which is 
 RS = -0.815 +  0.518 AHE               R2=0.806 (1) 
 (0.719)  (0.114) N=7. 
 [0.309]  [0.006] 
Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in the square brackets. The scatterplot 
shows a strong positive correlation between the growth of AHE in the year before a recession 
and the strength of the subsequent employment recovery, and the coefficient on AHE is 
significant at the 0.6% level.  
The analysis can be extended to all postwar recessions with data on AHEGP. One 
difference between pre- and post-1964 recessions is that, for a given level of pre-recession 
wage inflation, recovery strength was much higher before 1964, as shown in Table 1. There 
are several possible reasons for why RS was higher for a given level of prior wage inflation in 
the earlier period. First, peak-to-trough employment declines tended to be larger before 1964, 
and greater employment declines tend to be followed by strong employment rebounds. 
Second, wages appear to be more flexible in the earlier period, as wage inflation decreased, 
on average, by far more in pre-1964 recessions than in post-1964 recessions in the year 
following peak employment. In the year following peak employment, the growth rate of 
AHEGP decreased by an average of 5.48% in pre-1964 recessions (although the average 
decrease was only 3.47% if the 1948 recession is not included). In post-1964 recessions 
(excluding the 1980 recession in which wage inflation rose substantially in the year following 
its onset, probably because of its short duration), the growth rate of AHEGP fell, on average, 
by 0.46%.  
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To account for the stronger recoveries in the earlier period, Recovery Strength (RS) is 
not only regressed on AHEGP by itself, but is also regressed on AHEGP and a dummy 
variable for pre-1964 recessions (PR64DUM). The estimated equations are  
 RS = 0.011 +  0.504 AHEGP            R2=0.527 (2a) 
 (1.168)  (0.159) N=11, 
 [0.993]  [0.011] 
and 
 RS = -0.282 +  0.414 AHEGP  + 2.49 PR64DUM         R2=0.876 (2b) 
 (0.639)  (0.089) (0.525) N=11. 
 [0.670]  [0.0016] [0.0015] 
Both with and without PR64DUM, there is a strong positive relationship between the 
growth in earnings in the year before a recession and the rate of employment growth in the 
subsequent recovery. The coefficient on AHEGP is significant at the 1.1% level when 
PR64DUM is not included and is significant at the 0.16% level when it is included. Also, in 
(1), (2a), and (2b) the coefficients on pre-recession wage inflation are similar in magnitude, 
suggesting that the effect of wage inflation on RS is robust to the inclusion of pre-1964 data, 
the choice of the wage variable (AHE or AHEGP), and the inclusion of the dummy variable. 
The results imply that a 1% rise in prior wage inflation is associated with about a 0.4-0.5% 
increase in annualized employment growth in the subsequent recovery. 
Because there have been only 11 post-WWII recessions, the sample size in this study 
is small, so the results should be taken with some caution. However, while the sample size is 
small, the effect of prior wage inflation on recovery strength is highly significant, with p-
values ranging from 0.0016 to 0.011. 
A possible explanation for a positive relationship between pre-recession wage 
inflation and the strength of the subsequent recovery is downward nominal wage rigidity. 
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(See, for example, Kahn (1997), Altonji and Devereux (2000), Lebow, Saks, and Wilson 
(2003), and Fehr and Goette (2005) for empirical evidence concerning downward nominal 
wage rigidity.) During a recession, wage inflation tends to decrease gradually over time, with 
the growth rate of wages for individual workers distributed around the average growth rate. 
For a given decline in the growth rate of demand, the adjustment of wages to their new 
equilibrium will be more likely to entail notional nominal wages decreases for some workers 
if wage inflation is initially low. If these decreases do not occur because of downward 
nominal wage rigidity, employment among these workers will be lower than it would have 
been in the absence of nominal wage rigidity, resulting in lower growth of aggregate 
employment.       
Besides downward wage rigidity, another possible reason for the positive relationship 
between pre-recession wage inflation and recovery strength is that the zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates is more likely to be binding when inflation is low. To test the relevance 
of this explanation, (1), (2a), and (2b) are re-estimated with a dummy variable for recessions 
in which the 3-month Treasury bill rate fell below 1%. Contrary to what would be expected if 
the zero lower bound resulted in weaker recoveries, the coefficient on this variable is always 
positive (but insignificant), suggesting that the zero lower bound does not explain why 
recovery strength is related to prior wage inflation.   
Also, when (1), (2a), and (2b) are re-estimated with the growth rate of the Consumer 
Price Index in the year prior to the business cycle peak, instead of the growth rate of wages, 
the coefficient on price inflation and its degree of significance are much lower than when the 
equations are estimated with wage inflation, indicating that recovery strength is more closely 
related to prior wage inflation than to prior consumer price inflation.   
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These results suggest that central banks should consider wage inflation, as well as 
price inflation, in their conduct of monetary policy. Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) 
demonstrate that if wages and prices are both sticky, then wage inflation targeting 
substantially outperforms price inflation targeting in maximizing policymakers’ welfare 
functions.5 In addition, Mankiw and Reis (2003) assume that central banks use an inflation 
target to minimize the variance of the output gap, and consider four measures of inflation: 
energy prices, food prices, prices of other goods and services, and nominal wages. They 
demonstrate that central banks should place by far the greatest weight on wage inflation in 
order to stabilize the output gap.  
The present study provides an additional rationale for central banks to take wage 
inflation into account in conducting monetary policy. While the high rates of wage inflation 
in the 1970’s and early 1980’s were probably not desirable because of their repercussions on 
price inflation, in spite of the stronger recoveries in this period, a moderate target for wage 
inflation may be beneficial. For example, equation (1) predicts that if the growth rate in AHE 
prior to the 2008 recession had been 4.5% instead of 3.86%, the recovery strength would 
have risen from 1.58 to 1.91, an increase of 21%. 
While pre-recession wage inflation positively affects the strength of the subsequent 
recovery, it has little impact on the decrease in employment during a recession. When the 
peak-to-trough employment decline (PTED) is regressed on AHEGP in the year prior to 
recessions, the estimated equation is  
PTED  =  2.54  +  0.0748 AHEGP                                      R2=0.019 (3) 
 (1.33) (0.181) N=11. 
 [0.088] [0.689] 
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The coefficient on AHEGP is insignificant and the regression has little explanatory power, as 
evidenced by the low R2. Figure 2 presents a scatterplot of pre-recession wage inflation and 
the percentage decline in employment during the recession, showing that there is little 
relationship between these variables. When PTED is regressed on AHE with data from post-
1964 recessions, the coefficient on prior wage inflation is again insignificant.6  
A possible reason for why prior wage inflation is not significantly related to the 
severity of the employment downturn is that wage inflation usually decreases slowly in 
response to a disinflationary shock, so that it normally takes time for notional wage inflation 
to become negative for a significant number of workers.7 The one case in which low pre-
recession wage inflation was associated with a large decline in employment was the recession 
beginning in 2008, possibly because the combination of a severe negative demand shock and 
a low prior rate of wage inflation meant that the adjustment to the shock would have entailed 
an immediate reduction in nominal wages for many workers, rather than a period in which 
notional wage inflation gradually fell, before becoming negative for a significant number of 
workers. 
This study considers U.S. recessions and recoveries, and it is not clear whether the 
same pattern would be found for other countries. Conducting a similar analysis with other 
industrialized countries would be complicated by later starting dates for wage and 
unemployment data in many other countries and by different unemployment dynamics, as 
most other countries experienced more persistent movements in unemployment, but fewer 
short-term fluctuations. 
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3. Conclusion 
This study finds that the strength of employment growth during an economic recovery 
depends positively on wage inflation in the year before the onset of the preceding recession, 
possibly because downward nominal wage rigidity is more likely to be binding when wage 
inflation is low before an economic downturn. While pre-recession wage inflation is 
positively related to the strength of the subsequent recovery, it is not significantly related to 
the severity of the recession. A possible explanation is that it generally takes time for notional 
wage inflation to become negative for a significant number of workers in response to a 
contractionary shock, so that downward nominal wage rigidity usually does not adversely 
affect employment growth until the economy has started to recover.  
While it appears that downward nominal wage rigidity generally has a greater impact 
on the strength of the subsequent recovery than on the severity of the employment downturn, 
one exception is the 2008 recession. In that recession, a low prior rate of wage inflation was 
combined with the severe negative demand shock, so that the adjustment to the shock may 
have involved immediate notional nominal wage reductions for an appreciable number of 
workers. 
The findings in this study may help explain why employment has recovered so slowly 
in the three most recent recessions, as wage inflation before these recessions was far lower 
than in almost all previous post-war recessions. An implication of these results is that it may 
be desirable for central banks to consider wage inflation, as well as price inflation, in their 
conduct of monetary policy. 
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Table 1 
Peak 
Date 
Peak 
Emp. 
Trough 
Date 
Trough 
Emp. 
Peak-
Trough 
Emp. 
Decrease 
Recovery 
Date 
Recovery 
Emp. 
Months 
to 
Recovery 
Recovery 
Strength 
(RS) 
%Avg. 
Hourly 
Earnings 
%Avg. 
Hourly 
Earnings, 
Goods Prod. 
09/1948 45,295 10/1949 42,950 5.18% 07/1950 45,454 9 7.85  12.28% 
07/1953 50,536 08/1954 48,825 3.39 06/1955 50,790 10 4.85  9.03 
04/1957 53,238 06/1958 50,912 4.37 04/1959 53,320 10 5.70  5.29 
04/1960 54,812 02/1961 53,556 2.29 12/1961 54,871 10 2.95  3.70 
03/1970 71,452 11/1970 70,409 1.46 09/1971 71,617 10 2.06 6.35% 7.14 
07/1974 78,635 04/1975 76,461 2.76 02/1976 78,817 10 3.71 7.23 8.05 
03/1980 90,994 07/1980 89,837 1.27 01/1981 91,037 6 2.69 7.72 7.98 
07/1981 91,602 12/1982 88,769 3.09 11/1983 91,871 11 3.82 8.75 9.90 
06/1990 109,862 05/1991 108,241 1.48 02/1993 110,047 21 0.95 4.40 4.27 
02/2001 132,767 08/2003 130,147 1.97 02/2005 132,991 18 1.45 4.13 3.32 
01/2008 138,365 02/2010 129,649 6.30 04/2014 138,385 50 1.58 3.86 3.43 
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1 The employment figures are the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ estimates of total nonfarm employment. 
2 Mathematically, 100]1Emp.)h Emp./Troug [(Rec.  )(Strength ery covRe
12
 mRS , where m is the number 
of months between the trough and recovery.  
3 See Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013), Chapter 2 for a description of how AHE is calculated.   
4 Another wage variable that has been collected since 1947 is hourly compensation, which is reported on a 
quarterly basis. However, this measure is problematic for several reasons. First, it includes proprietors’ income, 
bonus and profit-sharing payments, and realizations of stock options, as well as wage and salary income. The 
inclusion of stock option realizations is especially problematic when considering wage growth before a 
recession, since these realizations are likely to be particularly high at the end of an expansion. Second, it is 
calculated by dividing an estimate of aggregate compensation by an estimate of the total number of hours 
worked, with the estimate of compensation based mostly on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the 
estimate of hours worked derived from BLS data. (See Mehran and Tracy (2001, p. 31) and Ruser (2001, pp. 
12-13) for a description of hourly compensation.) Third, these data are subject to large revisions, sometimes 
even after more than 60 years. Thus, hourly compensation may not be an accurate measure of the true marginal 
cost of labor. 
5 A policymaker’s welfare function is assumed to depend on the output gap, wage inflation, and price 
inflation. 
6 In fact, the two recessions that experienced the greatest employment declines since 1964 were the 
recession starting in 1981, which was preceded by the highest growth rate in AHE, and the recession starting in 
2008, which was preceded by the lowest growth rate in AHE.    
7 For example, Campbell (2014) simulates the response of unemployment and wage inflation to a decrease 
in nominal demand growth, and shows that simulated wage inflation is positive as long as employment is 
decreasing, and does not become negative until employment starts to rise, meaning that downward nominal 
wage rigidity would not become binding in this model until employment starts to recover.   
